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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
GOLDEN SPIKE EQUIPMENT CO.,
A Utah Corporation

Plaintiff-Respondent
No. 10266

vs.

HOWARD F. CROSHAW,

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case commenced as an action for the balance
due on a Conditional Sales Contract, payable in two installments, one of which was past due at the time the
action was filed and the second of which was accelerated
by Plaintiff-Respondent. Defendant-Appellant sought dismissal of the entire Complaint by a Motion for Summary
Judgment, the denial of which is the question concerned
with this appeal.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, in part, in that it dismissed Plain1

tiffs Complaint as to the second installment, and denied
the Motion,- in part, in that it declined to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint as to the first installment which was past
due at the time Plaintiff's Complaint was filed.
Trial of the case on its merits was held before a jury
us to the past-due installment only. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and the Court entered
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $941.54,
plus interest at 10 percent from November 1, 1963, and
for $1.55.24 attorney's fees and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
and a judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint.
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the lower Court's denial
of Defendant-Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment
as to the FIRST installment, and affirmance of the jury
verdict in favor of Plaintiff and of the judgment entered
by the lower Court pursuant to the verdict of the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent will be referred to in this brief
as Respondent and Defendant-Appellant will be referred
to as Appellant.
Golden Spike Equipment Company sold to Appellant
a used, 1957 Combine on July 30, 1963, the parties executing a Conditional Sales Contract which provided for a
cash price of $2.500, a time price differential of $124.61,
2

a credit of $700 as the down payment, and that the balance of $1,924.61 be paid in two installments, the first
installment of $941.61 to be paid November 1, 1963, and
the balance of $983.07 to be paid November 1, 1964, with
acceleration, at the election of the Seller of any unpaid
belance or other sums due, should the Buyer default on
the contract. Appellant refused to pay the installment
due November 1, 1963, and indicated he would not pay
anything further on the contract. Without prior knowledge
of Respondent, Appellant returned the combine to Respondent's yard.
Respondent and Appellant made several attempts to
arrive at a compromise settlement of the balance due, all
of which efforts failed. As a consequence, on May 20,
1964, Respondent filed a Complaint accelerating the payment not yet due, and demanding payment of the entire
balance of the contract in the amount of $1,924.61, together with interest, attorney's fees and costs.
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds the Contract was not enforceable under Section 15-'l-2a of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Court
denied Defendant's Motion insofar as it pertained to the
installment which was past due at the time of the filing
of the Complaint. The minute entry in the records of the
Clerk of the District Court of Box Elder County reads as
follows:
"The Motion for Summary Judgment having been submitted, and this being the time for decision on said
motion, at this time the Court declines to dismiss this
action on summary judgment. However, the motion

as to the second installment on the contract is granted,
but as-to the first installment, the motion is denied."
The case was tried before a jury on the past due
installment only, at which trial Respondent was granted
judgment as prayed for, without prejudice to file a Complaint on the second and last installment as the same
became past due.
POINT 1.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT AS TO THE PAST DUE INSTALLMENT.
The filing of a Complaint declaring the entire amount
of a Conditional Sales Contract due and payable does not
violate a Buyer's right under Section 15-1-2a B ( 4) of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to pay the full
indebtedness of a contract any time prior to final maturity.
Respondent has also been unable to find a statute
similar to Section 15-l-2a of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and has also been unable to find any cases from
other jurisdictions that are directly in point.
Appellant argues that the language of the statute is
clear and proposes two actions a seller can take to violate
the provision of subdivision ( 4) and suffer the penalty
set forth in subdivision ( 5). One is by refusing to accept
an advance payment by the buyer and the other is to
demand the entire unpaid balance before maturity.
4

However, quoting from subdivision ( 4), the statute
reads:
"Any provision in any conditional sale contract
for the sale of personal property to the contrary notwithstanding, the buyer may satisfy in full the indebtedness evidenced by such contract at any time before
the final maturity thereof, and in so satisfying such
indebtedness shall receive a refund credit thereon for
such anticipation of payments."
The remainder of the section is concerned with the
amount of interest refund to which a buyer would be entitled in the event of advance payment of a contract.
It should be particularly noted that in the same sentence in which the statute provides that a buyer may
satisfy in full the indebtedness evidenced by a contract
at any time prior to the final maturity thereof, the Legislature provides that the buyer, in so paying the indebtedness before the final maturity of the contract, is entitled
to a certain refund of interest on the anticipated payments. It should also be particularly noted that the
statute makes no reference whatsoever to the acceleration
of payments in a contract. Respondent therefore submits
that Appellant is misinterpreting the intent of subdivision
( 4) and that neither of the two courses of action of a
seller which he sets forth would invoke the penalty of
subdivision ( 5). It is neither the refusal of a seller to
accept advance payments nor the acceleration of payments which the legislature intended to penalize (subdivision 5), but the failure of the seller to give a "refund
credit thereon for such anticipation of payments."
5

Appellant quotes from In Re Steven's Estate, 107
Utah 255 at 259, 130 Pac. 2nd 85, where the Court said:
"The language of the statute is plain and its meaning is
dear, in which case there is no occasion to search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself." However, Appellant
is searching in this case far beyond the wording of Section
15-l-2a for an interpretation and an effect that is not so
much as hinted at, even though the language of Section
15-l-2a is "plain and its meaning clear."
POINT 2.
THE SUPREME COURT OF UT AH HAS, SINCE
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 15-l-2a, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF A
SELLER TO ACCELERATE PAYMENTS IN A
CONTRACT WHEN THE BUYER IS IN DEFAULT.
In the case of Soter vs. Snyder, decided by the Supreme Court of Utah on December 9, 1954, the respondent, Zeke Snyder, counterclaimed against appellant for
the entire amount due on a conditional sales agreement,
appellants having breached same by failing to make two
monthly payments due thereon and respondent Zeke
Snyder under the terms of said agreement having elected
to declare the entire sum due and owing.
The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the judgment
of the lower court for the respondent on his counterclaim.
Appellants argued that the court erred in granting
judgment on the counterclaim and further erred in providing in the judgment that Snyder retain title to the personal property until the judgment was paid in full. Quoting from the case:
6

"Appellants contend that such judgment was contrary to the law and the agreement of the parties because by providing that the seller may at his option
declare the entire sum due and owing upon the purchasers defaulting in any of the payments when due
or within 30 days thereafter, and upon such failure of
the purchasers, the sellers could retake possession of
said property and could retain any payments as liquidated damages, respondent thereby expressly agreed
that his only remedy for breach of this contract should
be repossession."
The Supreme Court replied:
"We cannot agree with this argument.
Further quoting:
"Did the court err in providing in the judgment
that respondent Zeke Snyder retain his title in the prope1ty until the judgment was fully paid and satisfied?
... We are of the opinion that the court did not err in
granting such a judgment and that such a judgment
merely enforces the terms of the contract into which
the p~rties voluntarily entered."
John Soter and Tom Soter, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs. Zeke Snvder and Strevell-Paterson Finance Co ..
a Corporatidn, Defendants and Respondents, 277 Pac.
2nd 966 ( 3 Utah 2nd 28).
POINT 3.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SUBDIVISION
( 4) MUST BE DETERMINED BY REVIEW OF
THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE.
Quoting from Sutherland Statutory Construction,
Volume 2, 3rd Edition, Chapter 47:
"A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose
and intent. Consequently, each part or section
7

should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.
Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the
one section to be construed."
Section 4703, Page 336.
Further quoting from Sutherland Statutory Construction:
"The literal interpretation of the words of an act
should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to
the apparent intention of the legislature and if the
words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention.
The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter
must if possible, be read so as to conform to the spirit
of the act "while the intention of the legislature must
be ascertained from the words used to express it, the
manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should
not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such
words." Thus words or clauses may be enlarged or
restricted to harmonize with other provisions of an
act. The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract
force of the words or what they may comprehend, but
in what sense were they intended to be used in the
act. The sense in which they were used by the legislature furnishes the rules of interpretation and when
this cannot be determined from the context of the
act, the court may resort to extrinsic aids. Obviously,
if the words of the act indicate the legislative intent
other sources may not be resorted to to establish a
meaning contrary to that intention."
Section 4706, page 339
Appellant argues for an interpretation of subdivision
( 4), which involves not just an isolated section or sentence
even, but a portion of one sentence. Appellant has lifted
from its context the first part of the first sentence of sub8

division ( 4), which states that a buyer "may satisfy in
full the indebtedness of a contract at any time before the
final maturity thereon" and ignored the second part of
the sentence which guarantees to the buyer a refund
credit. A reading of the complete sentence shows that
the legislature intended to assure a buyer that, in satisfying in advance an indebtedness on a contract, the buyer
is to receive a refund credit for such anticipation of payments. This refund credit would have to be given the
buyer whether he voluntarily paid the contract in advance
of the installments agreed to be paid, or was required to
pay in advance because of an acceleration provision in
event of default.
POINT 4.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SUBDIVISION
(4) IS DIRECTORY ONLY, AND THEN AS TO
THE BUYER RATHER THAN THE SELLER.
All that Section 15-l-2a B ( 4), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, requires is that the buyer "may satisfy"
(emphasis added) his indebtedness on a contract before
the final maturity date. The statute does not require that
the seller "must" provide the buyer with the opportunity
to pay before the final scheduled contract payment regardless of statements and actions by the buyer which
clearly indicate his intention not to pay.
Quoting from Sutherland Statutory Constmction, 3rd
Edition, Volume 2, Chapter 28:
"The important distinction between directory
and mandatory statutes is that the violation of the
former is attended with no consequence, while the
failure to comply with the requirements of the latter
9

either invalidates purported transactions or subjects
the_ noncomplier to affirmative legal liabilities."'This distinction grows out of the fundamental
difference in the intention of the legislature in enacting the two statutes. Although directory provisions
are not intended by the legislature to be disregarded,
yet the seriousness of noncompliance is not considered so great that liability automatically attaches for
failure to comply. The question of compliance remains for judicial determination. If the legislature
considers the provisions sufficiently important that
exact compliance is required then the provision is
mandatory."
Section 2801, Page 214.
Thus, the legislature, in using the word "may," in
Section l.5-1-2a B ( 4) has provided the buyer with an opportunity, should he so desire, to satisfy a contractual
indebtedness in full prior to the final maturity thereon,
hut has not placed upon the seller a mandatory obligation
to hold open the contract until a certain final scheduled
payment date, nor has the legislature by any mandatory
language or implied language invalidated other terms of
the same contract which provide for acceleration of payments.
Therefore, in the present case, where the buyer has
indicated, by clear action and positive statements, that he
lias no intention of exercising the opportunity afforded
him by the statute to make advance payment of his contract and is in fact in default therein, and because the
statute is not mandatory in its language, either that the
~eller provide the buyer with or that the buyer has the
opportunity to advance pay his contract, up until a certain
10

date, regardless of the buyer's express intention or default
on the contract, all Appellant's rights have been afforded him and, by proper interpretation of the statute
in question, Respondent cannot claim the seller should
be denied the right to collect payment of his contract.
POINT 5.
IT WOULD BE AN "ABSURD" AND "UNCONSCIONABLE" INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
15-l-2a, B(4) and (5), TO HOLD THAT MERELY
BY INVOKING A CONTRACTURAL PROVISION
FOR ACCELERATION, A SELLER SHOULD BE
DENIED THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE HIS CONTRACT.
Respondent submits two points which should here
be considered.
First, Appellant sought relief in the District Court
from the effect of an accelerated payment in a contract
into which Appellant had freely and voluntarily entered
and was granted such relief. The Complaint of the Respondent was dismissed as to the payment which had
been accelerated and trial was had before a jury upon the
merits of the past due payment only. The full protection
of the law, including any possible protection due Appe1lant
under Section 15-l-2a, was therefore fully accorded Appellant. However, Appellant, after losing his case before
the jury, now claims that even though the trial court did
not permit acceleration of the remaining payment, the
Respondent is not entitled to collect, even on a past due
payment, because of the fact it attempted to invoke acceleration; that the Seller must be further penalized and its
entire contract declared unenforceable. This appears to
11

Respondent to be not only an "absurd" interpretation of
the Statute in question, but an unconscionable one as well.
Second, Respondent contends that a reasonable interpretation of subdivision ( 4) is that the Legislature intended what the Statute says; that is, to guarantee to a
buyer the right to a refund credit in the event of advance
payment of his contract. This is a most equitable guarantee and one that has been protected by case law in other
jurisdictions.
For example, in the case of Northtown Theater Corporation, Appellants, vs. J. J. Mickelson, Trustee of the
Estate of Mill Citv_, Plastics, Inc., and Mill Citv
, Plastics
Industries, Inc., its successor, Bankrupt, Appellee, which
was decided in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, October 21, 1955, the Court or Appeals held that
a mortgagee could not collect interest beyond the day
to which the principal debt was accelerated.
This was an action involving a claim for interest by
a mortgagee against a bankrupt estate. The Referee in
Bankruptcy disallowed the claim for interest and the
mortgagee appealed. The Court of Appeals held that
"where chattel mortgage secured not only payment of
principal debt but also payment of interest, filing of bankruptcy proceedings by debtor did not entitle mortgagee
to invoke acceleration clause so as to collect unearned
interest, and mortgagee was entitled only to interest up to
date of payment of principal debt,"
Further quoting from the decision of the Appellate
Court at page 214:

"It was the contention of the Appellant before
the Referee in Bankruptcy and before the trial court
that it was entitled to interest up to the date when
the indebtedness became payable instead of limiting
the interest to the date of payment of the debt. . .
The trial court was of the view that the acceleration
clauses in the circumstances disclosed bv the record
created a penalty and hence were unenf~rceable and
that having invoked the acceleration clause as the
basis for its claim to unearned interest it was not
entitled to recover. The only question in this case
is whether or not the Court erred in limiting the right
to collect interest to the date of payment rather than
extending it to the date when the indebtedness became due and payable according to the written agreement of the parties."
" .... the trial court in its decision in this phase
of the case, among other things, said:
" ... in cases like the present, where the mortgage is given to secure a fixed sum representing the
aggregate of principal and the intrest thereon for a
period of the mortgage, the rule is that a clause accelerating the maturity of the debt will not be enforced except upon cancellation of the unearned
interest, for to do so would be unconscionable."
" ... lri other words, if under the circumstances here
disclosed Appellant could not, by invoking the acelera tion clause in his mortgage, have collected the
unearned interest from the debtor he could not
exact payment for such unearned interest from the
bankrupt's estate."

( 226 Federal 2nd 212)
No claim has ever been made by Appellant that Respondent attempted to collect interest to the date when
13

the indebtedness became payable, but rather the record
clearly shows that upon acceleration, Respondent sought
recovery of the principal debt with interest thereon only
to the date it had declared the entire principal balance
due and payable.
In summary ( 1) Appellant was granted relief by
the trial Court, from an accelerated payment, and ( 2)
Respondent did not make any attempt whatsoever to collect interest from Appellant beyond the accelerated payment date. To now hold that subdivision ( 5) requires
that Respondent be further penalized and denied the
right to enforce its contract because of its mere act of
trying to proceed under a contractual provision for acceleration would, Respondent submits, be a truly "absurd"
and "unconscionable" interpretation of Section 15-l-2a.

POINT 6.
THE FINAL MATURITY DATE OF A CONTRACT
MAY BE EITHER THE DATE UPON WHICH THE
FINAL PAYMENT IS SCHEDULED TO BE PAID,
OR THE DATE TO WHICH PAYMENT HAS
BEEN PROPERLY ACCELERATED BY THE
SELLER UPON DEFAULT OF THE BUYER.
The entire premise upon which Appellant seems to
base his case is that the legislature intended the final
maturity date of any and every contract to be the date
of the final regular payment, regardless of the terms of
the contract, and regardless of whether or not all payments are made as agreed. In laboring this point, Appellant overlooks the right of parties to voluntarily agree
upon such terms as they may desire. Further, the Su-

preme Court of Utah has recognized the validity of contract provisions for the acceleration of payments in the
event the buyer defaults. Respondent therefore submits
that when a buyer and seller have contracted for the
<'.cceleration of payments upon the default of the buyer,
the final maturity date of the contract is then no longer
the date the last payment could be made if all prior payments were regularly made, but the final maturity date of
the contract becomes that date upon which the seller has,
in accordance with the terms of the contract between the
parties, delcared the unpaid balance to be due and payable.
Under this recognition of the meaning of "final maturity date," it is not necessary to strain a part of a sentence in Section 15-l-2a B( 4) in such a way as to make
invalid all acceleration clauses in all contracts made in
Utah. Further, a buyer is protected by the statute in his
right to pay the unpaid balance of his contractural obligation in full prior to the final maturity date, and receive
full, correct interest refund credit, whether that maturity
date is the date the final scheduled payment becomes due
or the date to which final maturity is properly accelerated
by the seller upon the default of the buyer.
Since the Appellant in the present case had been
fully protected through the entire period of the contract
in his right to pay the balance off, had negotiated at length
with the seller, and had, in fact, conveved to the seller
his refusal to make payment of his indebtedness, and was
in default on the payment of the first installment, the
seller was under no obligation, either statutory, moral or
legal, to do a useless act and leave open the payment date
1.5

of the contract. On the contrary, the seller properly proceeded to Jake the only reasonable course of action to
bring the disagreement to a conclusion, and that was to
invoke acceleration, and declare the entire unpaid balance
due and payable, thereby advancing the final maturity
date to that agreed upon by the buyer in the event of his
default, which unpaid balance included principal, attorney's fees and interest to the advanced maturity date,
and to file legal action to recover the balance.
It should again be noted here that Respondent did
not seek interest on its contract to the final payment date
stated in the cantract had the payments been made on
the contract as agreed, but sought intrest only to and
including the day the entire balance was declared due
and unpaid. Respondent, in seeking interest only to the
advanced maturity date of the contract, thereby gave to
the Appellant, in effect, a refund credit on the interest
Appellant had agreed to pay (the time price differential),
thus fully recognizing and protecting the Appellant in his
statutory right to receive a refund credit in the event of
advance payment of the contract. It is immaterial that
the Appellant became entitled to a credit on interest because the advance maturity date of payment was brought
about by his own default on the contract.
POINT 7.
APPELLANT HAS MADE PAYMENT OF THE
CONTRACT BALANCE AND THIS APPEAL IS
THEREFORE NOT PROPER.
Shortly after the jury returned its verdict and judgment was rendered by the Court, the Appellant paid to
16

Respondent not only paid the full amount of the judgment,
but the full amount of the contract as well. Having done
so, he indicated his intention to abide by the judgment.
There is an annotation in 39 A. L. R. 2nd, commencing at page 1.53, which treats this subject. There is a considerable conflict of opinion as to whether or not a judgment, once paid, can be appealed.
Page 158 of the annotation sets forth a reasonable
standard by which to resolve the question, and we quote:
"In view of the conflicting results reached by
the courts under the test of voluntariness of payment
or performance of a judgment, it is submitted that
the test is not satisfactory.

"It is submitted that the proper test is whether
payment or performance of a judgment takes place
under circumstances which show an intention on the
part of the defeated party to abide by the judgment."
Execution had not been issued or served upon the
Appellant at the time he made payment to the Respondent, nor had any demands for the payment of the judgment been made upon him, nor had any threats of execution been made him, either written or oral. No coersion
of any kind had been exercised for the purpose of forcing
or even encouraging Appellant to make payment of the
judgment.
Further, Appellant did not pay the money into Court,
subject to the hearing of an appeal, nor did he indicate
any conditions to Respondent upon payment of the money
to Respondent, such as its return in the event of a successful appeal. He in fact paid off the entire contract.
17

It should therefore be concluded that payment of the
judgment by Appellant took place under circumstances
which show an intention on his part to abide by the judgment. Respondent submits that under these circumstances the appeal should be dismissed.
Respondent, in summary, submits that, since Appellant
was fully protected in his rights in the lower court in that
a careful and cautions trial judge did not permit acceleration of an installment not yet due and partially granted
Appellant's Motion for Summary judgment, and since there
has been no claim whatsoever that Respondent failed to
credit Appellant with a refund on his interest to the date
the entire balance of the contract was declared due and
payable, it would not be an equitable or justifiable interpretation of Section 15-l-2a, to penalize Respondent to
the extent of declaring its entire contract unenforceable.
The Statute does not purport to outlaw or rewrite
the right of parties to contract for any given due date,
including an advanced or accelerated due date for default,
impairment of security, insolvency or other reason. Section 15-l-2a is found under the "Interest" chapter and by
title has to do with maximum rates. Subsection B ( 4)
gives to a buyer a right to satisfy an obligation at any
time before final maturity and in so satisfying to receive a
refund credit. Appellant was not deprived of that right
here. In fact, the lower Court could have protected his
right by submitting to the jury not only the questions concerning the past due installment, but the amount of the
second installment as well, less the mandatory refund
credit. However, the Court bent over backwards to afford Appellant all possible rights hy dismissing without
~

prejudice Respondent's accelerated claim for the second
payment clue in November of 1964.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the balance of subdivision B ( 4)
makes it clear that the right of a buyer established thereby
is to prepay and receive a refund credit for such prepayment. Everything that follows the first part of the first
sentence has to do with the amount and computation of
the refund. Sudivision B ( 5) likewise refers to errors of
computation.
The evidence, the law and proper interpretation of
Section l.5-l-2a B ( 4) and ( 5) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, show that Respondent did not in
any way violate the right of the buyer to satisfy in full
the indebtedness he owed to the Respondent under the
terms of the conditional sale contract, and the penalty
provided in subdivision ( .5) should therefore not be invoked.
The appeal should further be dismissed because of
payment in full of the judgment by Appellant under such
circumstances as to indicate that he fully intended to be
hound by the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
Sherma Hansen
Omer J. Call
Attorneys for the
Plaintiffs-Respondents
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